The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Volume 10
Issue 4 November

Article 5

November 1983

Reagan, Pickle and Pepper: The Benefit Reduction Versus
Voluntary Approach to Encouraging Later Retirement
Eric R. Kingson
University of Maryland, Baltimore

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw
Part of the Family, Life Course, and Society Commons, Gerontology Commons, and the Social Work
Commons

Recommended Citation
Kingson, Eric R. (1983) "Reagan, Pickle and Pepper: The Benefit Reduction Versus Voluntary Approach to
Encouraging Later Retirement," The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 10 : Iss. 4 , Article 5.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol10/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you by the Western Michigan
University School of Social Work. For more information,
please contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.

REAGAN, PICKLE AND PEPPER:
THE BENEFIT REDUCTION VERSUS VOLUNTARY
APPROACH TO ENCOURAGING LATER RETIREMENT
Eric R. Kingson, Ph.D.
University of Maryland at Baltimore
School of Social Work and Camunity Planning

ABSTRACT
The
degree
to
which benefit reduction and voluntary
approaches to encouraging later retirement maximize four different
and often conflicting policy objectives is assessed as are costs
and benefits of these approaches to healthy and unhealthy older
workers, minorities and wonen.
While both approaches encourage
later retirement, there are clear differences in the approaches in
terms of meeting the goal of financing Social Security versus
adequacy and social equity.

Economic problems between 1977 and 1983 resulted in a
significant short-term financing problem in Social Security's Old
Age Survivors Insurance Trust Fund.
These economic problems
combined with a projected long-term deficit also helped create the
conditions under which consideration of proposals to raise the
normal age of retirement became politically feasible.
Several
years of political debate over alternative retirement age policy
proposals culminated with the enactment of the 1983 Amendments to
the Social Security Act. These Amendments include a provision
which will encourage later retirement through benefit reductions
resulting from gradually raising the age of eligibility for full
* This article was initially prepared as a paper for the National
Policy
Center
on Employment and Retirement at the Andrus
Gerontology Center of the University of Southern California.
The
paper was supported by AoA grant 90AP0002/01. The conclusions
reachea are the author's and are not attributable to
the
Administration
on
Aging.
The
author
acknowledges
with
appreciation the useful comments of the staff of the National
Policy Center and outside reviewers.
Needless to say, any
problems that might remain in the paper
are
solely
the
responsibility of the author.
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retirement,
spouse and widow(er)s benefits to 67 over a 27 year
perioa, beginning in
2000.
The Amendments also contain two
provisions providing voluntary incentives to later retirement
through changes beginning in 1990 which will liberalize the Social
Security earnings test and increase the value of
delaying
retirement past the normal retirement age.
hen this paper was initially written in 1981, proposals that
would encourage later retirement had been put forth by the
President, Congressman Pickle and Congressman Pepper.
Those based
on a benefit reduction approach (the Reagan and Pickle proposals)
would
have provided incentive for continued employment by,
reducing Social Security protections or benefits. Those based on
voluntary approach
(the Pepper proposals) would encourage later
retirement by use of incentives that increase the value of Social
Security
and
other pensions for later retirement,
and by
emphasizing the goal of expanding employment opportunities for
older workers.
Proposals consonant with the benefit reduction approach were
given the greatest attention because they produce large savings
for Social Security.
They were also most controversial because
many argue that they compromise other equally essential retirement
policy goals-adequacy and social equity; and also would produce
disproportionate savings from the more economically vunerable.
This paper analyzes the Reagan, Pickle and Pepper proposals
of 1981.
While these proposals are outdated, the analysis remains
relevant for two reasons.
First, elements of each of these
proposals are similar to the retirement age policy changes enacted
under the 1983 amendments.
Second, the phasing in of the new
normal retirement age does not begin until 2000. It seems quite
possible that the debate over whether and how to raise the
retirement age could be re-opened before 2000.

ORGANIZATION AND SUMMARY OF PAPER

This paper has two objectives.
First, it assesses the degree
to which benefit reduction and voluntary approaches maximize four
different and often conflicting retirement policy objectives: 1)
providing work incentive for older workers, 2) income adequacy, 3)
social equity-the similar treatment of persons in
similar
circumstances,
and 4) meeting the financial commitments of the
Social Security system. Particular attention is paid to the work
incentive objective.
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Second, this paper identifies the costs and benefits of these
approaches to four groups of older persons: 1) healthy older
workers, 2) unhealthy older workers,* 3) women and 4) minorities.
within the context of the analysis
This
is
accomplished
identifying trade-offs among the approaches in terms of meeting
policy objectives.
Before analyzing the three retirement age proposals advanced
in 1981, several points need to be made about their categorization
as part of either the "benefit reduction" approach or "voluntary"
Wihile, as the reader will discern, the author has a
approach.
preference for proposals that encourage work without also reducing
benefits scheduled under current law, the terminology is simply a
means
of
categorizing two fundamentally different ways of
in
is
Second, not everyone
encouraging later retirement.
agreement over what they consider a benefit reduction to be. For
example, some would argue that raising the normal retirement age
under Social Security is not a benefit reduction, but merely an
adjustment for increases in longevity that have occurred since
1940; or similarly, that small reductions in benefits promised
under current law are not benefit reductions, but merely slow the
Wile these are not entirely unarguable
growth of benefits.
points of view, the facts are that either type of change would
reduce benefits relative to what is scheduled under current law;
are most appropriately
and therefore-in the author's opinionclassified under the benefit reduction approach. Third, it is
clear that in many policy areas-including retirement policy-the
use of the "stick" ("benefit reduction" approach) to meet policy
objectives is often more appropriate than the "carrot" ( the
"voluntary" approach).
In fact, the 1983 Amendments include
changes in retirement age policy that draw from both these
approaches-the phased-in gradual increase in retirement age to 69
representative of the benefit reduction approach and eventual
liberalization the in earnings test and delayed retirement credit
representative of the voluntary approach.
Two of the proposals (Pickle and Reagan) can be classified
Enactment of the
primarily under the benefit reduction approach.
* The term "unhealthy older workers" refers to workers with health
problems who do not meet Social Security or SSI eligibility
standards, yet whose health problems are sufficiently severe as to
The
constrain their ability to continue or find employment.
severity of these health conditions ranges from those, that by
themselves, would have a modest impact on the ability to work to
those that virtually preclude work.
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Pickle Bill of 1981 would have encouraged later retirement by
gradually increasing the normal age of retirement to 68 -in the
Social Security program.
Enactment of the proposal advanced in
1981 but later withdrawn by the Reagan Administration would have
encouraged later retirement by reducing the value of Social
Security benefits, expecially for persons retiring before age 65.
The third proposal-the Pepper Older Worker Employment Incentives
Act-is consistent with the volmtary approach.
Enactment would
have encouraged later retirement by increasing the value (relative
to current law)*
of Social Security benefits for postponed
retirement and by the elimination of age discrimination and other
barriers to the employment of older workers.
The paper begins with a brief review of the factors that have
converged to make retirement age policy a national issue. Then,
the three proposals are described. The major portion of the paper
analyzes the impact of benefit reduction and voluntary approaches
on the four policy objectives.
The analysis is restricted
primarily to non-private pension provisions and policies.
The basic argument developed in this paper is that later
retirement can be encouraged quite adequately by either voluntary
or "benefit reduction" approaches.
The choice of approaches
ultimately reflects the importance placed on the goal of reducing
financial deficits in the Social Security system versus the goals
of the adequate and socially equitable treatment of program
participants. The benefit reduction approach does produce much
more Social Security savings, but at the cost of significant
reductions in benefits for groups that often experience limited
employment
opportunities-older
women, minorities and older
workers with health problems.
The voluntary
approach
can
encourage later retirement, but to create significant shifts in
labor market activity through the use of voluntary incentives
would probably require large increases in Social Security and
general revenue expenditures at a time in which Social Security's
financing was the central concern, it was not surprising that
retirement age policy changes reflected the primacy of the
financing goals.
* It should be noted that the proposed increase in the delayed
retirement credit in the Pepper Bill is not sufficient to make the
value of retirement between ages of 65 and 70 actuarially
neutral.
So while increasing the value of retirement after 65,
the disincentive to work after 65 would still exist, though it
would be smaller.
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THE EMERGENCE OF THE RETIREMENT AGE ISSUE
Since the end of World War Two,
increased early retirement
has been
one of the dominant trends in the economy.
As reduced
early
retirement benefits
became available
under
the Social
Security program for workers retiring between the ages 62 and 64,
growing numbers of men and women have accepted these benefits.
In
1977 for example, 68 percent
of retiring male workers and
78
percent
of
retiring
female workers accepted
reduced
early
retirement benefits. Labor force participation rates of men also
reflect
this
trend.
Between 1947 and 1980, labor force
participation among men aged 55 to 64 dropped by about 19 percent,
from 89.6 to 72.3 percent.
The growing separation from the labor
force of men aged 65 and over is even more dramatic.
Labor force
participation of this
group is less than half of what
it
was
in
1947--having
declined
from
45.8 percent
to 19.1 percent.
Reflecting the trend of married women entering
the labor
force,
the labor force participation of women aged 55 to 64 has increased
between
1947
and 1980 from 24.3 to 41.5 percent.
This increase,
while dramatic, is slightly
sualler than the increased involvement
of younger female cohorts, suggesting
the possibility that the
trend toward increased labor force participation among women may
be somewhat offset in the older cohorts by the early retirement
trend.
In
fact,
among women
aged 65 and over, labor force
participation has remained fairly
stable during
these
years,
at
about nine percent.
What explains the trend toward early retirement? There are
two somewhat conflicting answers
to this question.
The first
explanation suggests that the growing
availability of early
retirement benefits in Social Security and private pensions has
encouraged workers to leave work before age 65.
This is presently
the
dominant explanation and one of the implicit assumptions of
approaches that would encourage later
retirement
through benefit
reductions.
The
second
perspective
suggests that chronic
unemployment
in
the American
economy is
a more
fundamental
explanation.
This line of reasoning
suggests
that the early
retirement option has been made widely available to older American
workers as a means both of encouraging
the
retirement of older
workers capable of continued
employment
and to ameliorate the
unemployment
of
others.
This
perspective
suggests
that
encouragement
of
later
retirement cannot be accomplished simply
through the use of employment incentives.
As will be discussed in
the conclusion, the ultimate outcome
of current retirement
age
debate will
be greatly influenced by the extent to which one of
these perspectives predominates.

-583-

The emergence of current concern over retirement age policy
is clearly linked to issues of cost. At a time in which the older
population is growing and living longer,
serious questions have
been asked about whether the Country can afford to have retirement
policies setting the normal retirement age at 65 and allowing-and
in some cases-encouraging retirement well before 65.
In fact,
Congress has recently given its answer by changing the Social
Security law to gradually phase in a new normal retirement age of
67 between 2000 and 2027.
Another issue concerns whether the
economy can afford the loss of capable and productive workers
through early retirement.
Presently, 11.2 percent of the population is aged 65 and
over.
As the post-World War II babies reach retirement age, the
aged are expected to grow as a percent of population to as much as
18.3 percent of the population by 2030 (Special Committee on
Aging,
1980).
The growth of the aged population is somewhat
offset by decline in the under 18 population.
Still Social
Security seems likely to place a larger burden on the future
working population. Also, assuming the continuance of present
retirement patterns,
labor shortages may materialize, especially
during the period in which the war babies retire-though such
shortages are far from certain.
The older population is also living longer. When the Social
Security system paid out its first benefits-1940-life expectancy
at age 65 was about 13 years.
Today, it
is
16.3 years,
an
increase of over 3 years. An Actuarial Note published by the
Social Security Administration presents measures of the ratio of
retirement
expectancy
to
total
work
experience for the
population.
using this ratio as a standard, the findings suggest
that "retirement age in 1980 equivalent to age 65 retirement in
1940 is more that 69 years." By 2000, the equivalent age would be
more
that 71 and by 2025, more than 72 (Social Security
Administration, June 1981).
Assuming that age 65 continues as the
normal retirement age, this lenghtening of retirement relative to
work results in an added burden on the future working population,
which some argue will be substantially offset by the assumed
growth of the economy. Others would also point out that as the
economy grows (as it has since 1940), it is quite appropriate to
choose-as the United States has-to increase the average number
of years in retirement relative to the average number of years
worked.
The combined trends of early retirement, a growing aged
population, a shrinking working-age population and increasing life
expectancies are the primary forces that drove the long-term
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financial deficits of the Social Security system, that were
projected prior to the enactment of the 1983 Amendments to the
Social Security Act.
The short-run problems projected before
enactment of these amendments were primarily the result of the
failure of the economy to operate as expected. Generally, between
1977 and 1983, inflation has been considerably higher than
expected and wage increases (relative to inflation) lower.
This
resulted in higher than expected costs (because benefits increase
to adjust for inflation) and smaller revenues (because payroll tax
revenues increase with the growth of wages).
The situation was
aggravated by high rates of unemployment which also reduce the
system's revenues. Fortunately, with the enactment of the 1983
Amendments,

Social

Security's cash programs are now in actuarial

balance.
The retirement age issue emerged in a conservative political
context.
Congress
having felt that it disposed with the
distasteful issue of Social Security financing in 1977, was not
pleased by the need to deal with it again. A major thrust of
Congress since 1981 and the Reagan Administration has been to
control the growth of social programs, of which Social Security is
by far the largest. Consequently, as budget deficits deepened, it
was increasingly tempting to view Social Security as a source of
both present and future budget reductions.
Approaches
to
encouraging
later retirement through benefit reductions and
voluntary incentives have emerged frcm and were acted upon within
this context.

THREE APPROACHES

As mentioned, the Pickle and Reagan Administration proposals
represented the "benefit reduction" approach to encouraging later
retirement
while the Pepper Bill represented the voluntary
approach. Independent of the fact that they are not presently
under active consideration-they are worthy of analysis. The
analytic issues identified in this
analysis
will-in
all
likelihood-- remain relevant to future retirement age debates.
Also, the analysis is applicable to the retirement age changes
made by the 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act. This
analysis begins by identifying the major aspects of
these
proposals that have implications for a retirement age policy.
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THE PICKLE BILL
As a part of a comprehensive legislative package concerned
with Social Security financing (HR 3207), Congressman J. J. Pickle
proposed in 1981 gradually increasing the normal eligibility age
for retirement benefits to age 68, beginning with 1990.
By 2000,
age 68 would be the normal age of retirement within Social
Security.
Age 62 would be maintained as the earliest age of
eligibility for early retirement benefits, but the value of early
retirement benefits would be significantly reduced.
Under present
law,
retirement benefits are reduced 5/9ths of one percent for
each month of retirement before age 65-resulting
in
the
actuarially fair treatment of persons retiring between ages 62 and
65.
Under the Pickle Bill, benefits would be reduced 1/2 of a
percent for each month of retirement before age 68.
At the
earliest age of retirement-62-retirees presently receive 80
percent of the normal retirement benefit (80 percent of the
primary insurance amount - PIA).
Under the Pickle Bill, their
benefits would be reduced to 64 percent. Other sections of the
Pickle Bill proposed the elimination of the earnings test for
persons over 68 and the repeal of the delayed retirement credit as
of 1983.* The bill is not presently before Congress.
The Pickle retirement age proposal is quite similar to those
of several recent national study groups-the 1979 Advisory Council
on Social Security, the President's Comission on Pension Policy,
the 1981 National Comission on Social Security. These proposals
differed slightly in that they tended to suggest a later and
lengthier phase-in period and also suggested a gradual increase in
the early retirement age to 65.
Because of the similarity between
the Pickle Bill and these other proposals, much of the analysis of
the Pickle proposal pertains to these other proposals as well.
The analysis also applies to the change in retirement age recently
enacted by Congress. Under the new law, the normal retirement age
will ultimately be increased to 67 by 2027.
Persons retiring at
age 62 in 2022 and later will receive an early retirement benefit

* If the earnings test is repealed,
there is
little
reason to
maintain the delayed retirement credit since retirement after age
68 would neither be penalized nor rewarded.
If the goal is
actuarial neutrality - to avoid favoring persons retiring after
age 68, the delayed retirement credit would have to be repealed.
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with a 30% actuarial reduction (instead of 20% as is the case
through 1999).
widows and spouse eligibility ages are also
affected. *
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL
The Social Security financing package proposed by
the
President
in May 1981 contained six proposals which would
encourage later retirement primarily through benefit reductions.
First, effective in 1982, the Administration proposed to more than
double
the reduction for early retirement by reducing the
retirement benefits by 1.25 percent for each month of retirement
between the ages of 62 and 65 as a means of producing savings and
discouraging early retirement.
Under this proposal
workers
retiring at age 62 would receive 55 percent of the normal
retirement benefit.** Second, the elimination of dependent's
benefits for the children of early retirees was proposed.
Third, the removal of all non-medical factors from the
disability determination decision in Social Security and SSI for
older workers was proposed. Under present law, age, education and
previous employment are taken into account when determining
disability for older workers.
Fourth, a change in the computation points for the average
inoexed monthly earning (AIME) from age 62 to 65 was proposed.
This would discourage early retirement because it would result in
the calculation of a smaller PIA for workers out of the labor
force before age 65. This would also encourage continued work
beyond age 65 because th would result in a reduction of benefits
for most normal age retirees.
* Congressman Pickle was also
sponsor of the retirement age
provision that was enacted into law in the 1983 Amendments. The
major differences between the 1981 Pickle proposal and the new
are: Under the new law the age of eligibility for full retirement,
spouse and widow(er)s benefits is 67, instead of 68; the phase-in
date begins later and the phase-in is longer; the retirement
proposal in the new law saves less money than the 1981 Pickle
proposal.

** Persons retiring at age 65 receive a benefit equivalent to 100%
of the primary insurance amount (unless their right to a spouse
benefit is larger).
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Fifth, the Administration proposed to reduce Social Security
benefits by approximately 10 percent to be phased in between 1982
and 1987 through a technical revision of the benefit formula.
Rather than increasing the bend points in social security

benefit

formula by I00 percent of wage increases, the Administration
proposed a 50 percent increase between 1982 and 1987.* Again, this
might serve to encourage later retirement. Finally, to encourage
employment beyond age 65, the Administration proposed elimination
of the earnings test by 1985 (Select Camnittee on Aging, 1981a).
Unlike the other five proposals, the elimination of the earnings
test is consistent with the voluntary approach to encouraging
later retirement.
Like the Pickle approach, the Reagan approach to discouraging
early retirement and encouraging later retirement relied primarily
on negative rather than positive incentives. The major thrust of
the proposals was to discourage early retirement by reducing the
benefits of early retirees and to encourage work past age 65 by a
general reduction in the level of benefits for all future
retirees.
THE PEPPER OLDER %DRKER INCENTIVES ACT OF 1981
The Pepper Bill (HR 3397) represents a different approach to
encouraging later retirement. In contrast with the two other
proposals, it relied on positive rather than primarily negative
incentives. A fact sheet developed by the House Select Cammittee
on Aging lists the five major work-encouraging elements of the
Older Worker Employment Incentives Act of 1981 as:
* The Primary Insurance Amount (PIA)-perhaps best thought of as
the monthly benefit received by a worker retiring at age 65-for a
covered worker reaching age 62 in 1979 was equal to the sum of 90%
of the first $180 of the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings, plus
32% of the next $905 of the AIME, plus 15% of the AIME in excess
of $1085.
The bend points refer to the dollar amounts at which
the percentages changes, and are updated each year for changes in
average wages.
By 1981 these bend points were $211 and $1274,
respectively. Indexing of the bend points by yearly changes in
average wages helps assure that Social Security replaces a
relatively constant proportion of prior earnings for successive
cohorts of retirees.
(The AIME is a measure of average monthly
earnings over the worklife of an individual and is wage indexed to
make dollars earned throughout a person' s worklife
roughly
equivalent.)
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1) The graduated increase in the delayed retirement credit.
Workers retiring after 1981 are scheduled to have benefit
increases of three percent per year for each year of delayed
retirement between the ages of 65 to 70.
Under the Pepper
proposal the value of the delayed retirement credit would
increase by one percent per year for each year of post- poned
retirement between ages 65 and 70, averaging five percent a
year for workers choosing to retire at age 70.
2) The liberation, but not elimination of the earnings
tests. Persons earning less than $4000 above the earnings
exemption ceiling would be subject to a smaller marginal tax
on their benefits (25 percent up to the first $2000 and 33
percent for the next $2000).
After that the current marginal
tax of 50 percent would be applied. The earnings limit and
bend points would be wage indexed.
3) Elimination of all forms of age discrimination in employment
by
closing loopholes and exemptions in the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.
4) The provision of tax credits up to $3000 in the first year
and $1500 in the second to employers hiring low income
workers aged 62 and over.
5) A provision to amend the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) to require continued accrual of pension
benefits
for
older
workers after the normal age of
retirement.
The voluntary approach embedded in the Pepper Bill is
distinguished
from coercive approaches by both the utilization of
measures that increase the availability of employment
for older
workers,
the substitution of positive for negative incentives to
encourage later retirement and the reality that it
would produce
considerably smaller savings for Social Security.
The Social
Security Amendments of 1983 contain voluntary incentives for later
retirement, liberalizing the earnings test (a 33% marginal tax
rate beginning in 1990) and increasing the delayed retirement
credit gradually, beginning in 1990, from 3 to 8 percent.
PROVIDING WORK INCENTIVES
The extent to which the coercive and voluntary approaches are
likely to encourage later retirement are examined in
this
section.
Then, specific impacts on healthy older workers,
unhealthy older workers, wanen and minorities are identified.
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GENERAL IMPACT
Both the Reagan Administration proposal and t ? 1981 Pickle
Bill relied primarily on benefit reductions to _ncourage later
retirement and assumed that older workers are or will in the
future
be willing and able to work longer.
In terms of
encouraging continued employment until age 65, it would seem that
the Reagan proposal offers the strongest motivation. At the time
the proposal was advanced, average benefits of $580.70 a month
were expected for persons retiring at age 62 in 1985.
In
contrast, under the Administration proposal, the average benefit
anticipated
at
age
62
was $348.30.
After age 65,
the
Administration proposal would continue to offer incentives to work
since, on average, there would be an approximately 23 percent
reduction in Social Security benefit levels which would make
retirement more costly. Under the Pickle Bill, persons retiring
at age 62 after the year 2000 would receive a benefit that would
be, on average, about 16 percent less than under current law and
persons retiring at age 65 would receive about 18 percent less.
By reducing the benefits of persons retiring before age 68 by six
percent a year and by eliminating the scheduled increase to three
percent a year in the delayed retirement credit, the Pickle Bill
would, relative to current law, seem to create a strong financial
incentive to work until age 68.
Are benefit reduction approaches to
encouraging
later
retirement likely to work?
Certainly, economic theory would
suggest that both the Pickle and Reagan approaches would encourage
later retirement by altering the work-leisure choices of future
older workers.
Increasing the reduction for early retirement
would mean that the price of leisure relative to work would become
more expensive. Also,
there is an income effect that would
discourage
retirement.
By increasing the cost of leaving
work-that is, by reducing retirement benefits-workers have less
"income" available for the purchase of retirement leisure.
Empirical verification can also be found in the retirement
decision literature.
Robert Clark and David Barker's (1981)
review of this literature finds that all retirement decision
research supports "the hypothesis that pension eligibility and
higher levels of pension wealth lead to earlier retirement"
although the incentive offered by social security pensions is
probably less than that offered by private and special public
employees pensions.
%bile it is generally agreed that
reductions will create an incentive
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Social Security benefit
for continued labor force

participation, the strength of this incentive is difficult to
estimate.
If it is true that most early retirees leave work
voluntarily in response to public and private pension incentives,
then it
can be argued that a reversal of these incentives will
also reverse the early retirement trend.
In testimony supportive
of the Reagan Administration proposal before the Select Camittee
on
Aing,
Rita
Ricardo-Campbell-a
Hoover
Institution

econmist-pointed
out
that
a
recent
Social
Security
Administration study by Julian Abbott shows "conclusively that
more than 80 percent of men aged 62 to 64 years old are healthy
enough to work" (Ricardo-Canpbell, 1981).
She refers to findings
showing that 8 percent of white men and 13 percent of black men
aged 60 to 64 in 1971 stated that health prevented them from
working in 1969.* These data are used to suggest that it is the
presence of the early retirement option, not problems of health or
unemployment that explain the decline in labor force participation
of older workers. Michael Boskin's findings based on a survey of
five-thousand households are also supportive of this position. He
finds the income effect of social security benefits to be the
single most powerful inducement to retirement of workers ages 62
and over, and the best explanation of the declining labor force
participation among men aged 55 and over (Subcommittee on Social
Security, 1981).
There
is,
however, much data that suggests otherwise
(Andrisani, 1977; Bixby, 1978; Kingson, 1981,1981a; Parnes &
Nestel, 1975; Sheppard, 1977). Virginia Reno's analysis of data
from the Survey of Newly Entitled Beneficiaries shows that among
men aged 62 to 64 retiring in 1969, only 22 percent listed reasons
suggesting their retirement was voluntary. In contrast, fully 54
percent listed health and another 20 percent employment problems
as their reason (Reno, 1976).
Analysis of the Social Security
Administration's Retirement History Survey data shows that health
was the main reason given for labor force withdrawal for nearly
two-thirds of men aged 58 to 63 who were out of the labor force in
1969 (Schwab, 1976).
While there is disagreement over the extent
to which health is a cause of early retirement rather than an
excuse, most analysis would agree that it is one of the major
* These findings can be interpreted differently. First, in 1969
these men were age 58 to 62 when health prevented them from
working. The data do not show how many more men were prevented
from working when they reached ages 62-64. Second, other findings
from the study show that among men age 60 to 64 in 1971 health was
reported as affecting the work of 35 percent of the whites and 42
percent of the blacks (Abbott, 1980).
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variables (if not the
retirement decision.

major

one)

which

influences

the

early

In reality, the retirement decisions of an individual is
usually influenced by many factors-though one factor may be
dominant.
The early retirement decision is, therefore, probably
best understood as influenced by health and income as well as
other factors.
A Department of Labor Study mandates by the 1978
Age Discrimination in Euployment Act and recently released by the
House Select Committee on Aging (1981b) suggests that a social
security benefit reduction strategy will not greatly increase the
labor force participation of older workers. Using a retirement
decision model developed for the Department of Labor,
projections
of the impact of reducing Social Security benefits by ten and
twenty percent on labor force participation of persons aged 60 to
7
in 1985, 1990 and 2000 show that the effect of benefit cuts
were "surprisingly snall in size and inconsistent in direction."
The ten percent cut is estimated to result in an expansion of the
labor force by only 64,000 in 2000 (Select Committee 1981b).
These findings may indicate that benefit reductions without
accompanying employment opportunities for older workers create
strong incentives for continued work, but only those persons with
continued employment opportunities are in a position to respond to
these incentives. The rest can simply be expected to leave work
accepting smaller Social Security pensions.
The Pepper Bill took a different approach to encouraging work
until age 65.
By maintaining current benefit levels for early
retirement, the Bill provided relatively little
new monetary
encouragement to continue work until age 65.
However, one unique
aspect of the Bill is its implied recognition of the difficulties
older workers,
especially low income workers, experience finding
employment.
This is accomplished through a tax credit proposal to
encourage employers to hire low income workers age 62 and over.
This
proposal
could
increase
the
supply
of employment
opportunities for older workers.
There
is,
however,
the
possibility that given the availability of this tax credit,
employers will substitute low wage older workers for low wage
younger workers.
After age 65, the bill provided additional
incentives for continued work by a gradual increase in the delayed
retirement credit, requiring continued accrual of pension benefits
for workers over 65, eliminating age discrimination including
mandatory retirement, and liberalizing the earnings test.
The Pepper approach assunes that a considerable number of
older workers want to work longer and will if certain employment
barriers are removed. A recent Harris Survey provides support for
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this assumption
(Louis Harris and Associates, 1979).
The survey
shows that 53 percent of currently retired workers reported that
they would have preferred full- or part-time employment when they
retired and that among workers aged 50 to 64,
51 percent would
prefer not to retire and "only 15 percent plan to retire before
the normal retirement age." However, it should be pointed out that
what people report they would do in surveys, can vary considerably
from what they might actually do given an appropriate employment
opportunity.
Findings from the Department of Labor Age Discrimination in
Employment Study (Select Camittee on Aging, 1981b) also suggest
that the Pepper approach would lead to an increase in labor force
participation among older workers. The study estimates that the
elimination of mandatory retirement "would result in 195,000
additional older men being in the labor force in 2000." Analysis
that assumed a ten percent increase in future employer pension
benefits when the normal age of retirement was below age 65, led
to the conclusion that the labor supply of older workers in 2000
would increase by 49,100 under current age discrimination laws and
by 67,700 if
mandatory retirement is
eliminated.
Mile not
directly testing the impact of increasing the delayed retirement
credit in social security the findings imply that this approach
would result in increased labor force participation among older
persons-though of very modest proportion.
The Pepper proposal
which would liberalize,
but not eliminate the earnings test,
provided less incentive than the Reagan Administration and Pickle
approaches which would eliminate the earnings test altogether.
Clearly, the impact of both benefit reduction and voluntary
approaches to encouraging
the employment of older workers is
highly dependent on the economic context in which they would be
implemented.
If labor shortages materialize,
then the market
place can be expected to encourage continued employment of older
workers by the reversal of private pension early retirement
incentives, by the elimination of employment barriers for older
workers,
by the development of
more
part-time
employment
opportunities and by encouraging the development of flexible
retirement options.
The increase of employment opportunitied
combined with the implementation of either approach would offer a
powerful incentive for continued employment.
Similarly,
high
levels of inflation could affect the retirement decision in a
manner that encourages later retirement.
Again,
the cambination
of inflation and either approach should provide significant
incentives to retire later.
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Either approach could also serve to
legitimate
later
retirement.
For example,
by establishing 68 as the normal
retirement age, the Pickle Bill would most clearly establish a new
publicly sanctioned retirement age.
But, the Reagan and Pepper
bill would also indicate to the public that early retirement is
becoming less acceptable and later retirement a national goal.
The creation of public policy that established a goal of later
retirement would probably modify retirement expectations,
and
employer pensions seem likely to respond by instititionalizing
later retirement ages or encouraging later retirement.
Both approaches to encouraging later retirement are capable
of leading to greater labor force participation among older
workers.
Positive and negative incentives do seem to work, though
the magnitude of effect varies with particular plans.
The
magnitude of the impact of each approach would be largely
conditioned by prevailing economic conditions.
An important question that needs to be examined now concerns
the extent to which these approaches are likely to provide
employment incentives for specific groups of older workers.

IMPACT OF WORK INCENTIVES ON SPECIFIC GROUPS
As has been pointed out, enactment of the Pickle, Reagan or
Pepper proposals would have created some incentives for continued
employment.
The impact of these incentives on particular groups
would vary greatly,
depending upon the health and employment
options available to these groups.
HEALTHY WRKERS:

WORK INCENTIVE IMPACTS

Healthy older workers* are probably in the best

respond--by postponing

through enactment of any of these proposals.

would

encourage

position

to

retirement-to the incentives established
The Reagan

proposal

healthy workers with employment opportunities to

continue working until at least age 65,
starting
in 1982.
The
approach assumes that there is an adequate supply of jobs in the

economy to meet the employment demands of older workers.

However,

in a high unemployment economy, older workers-like many younger
ones-often lack employment opportunities.
So, in the short-run,
* "Healthy older workers" refers to those older workers in good
health or with health problems that do not
represent
an
appreciable barrier to continuing or finding employment.
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the
Administration's
proposal
might
have intensified
the
unemployment problems of some healthy older workers.
The Pickle
Bill would--like the Reagan proposal--encourage increased labor
force participation in the future.
Raising retirement age to 68
would also intensify the unemployment problems of future older
workers in a below full employment economy.
The development of
early
retirement
and
normal retirement opportunities both
nationally and within particular industries has been partially
motivated
by
high levels of unemployment.
Retirement has
frequently been used to reduce unemployment.
In
the absence of
employment opportunities, even healthy workers willing and able to
work, may be unable to respond to these incentives. A chief
advantage for this group of healthy workers of the voluntary
approach as exemplified by the Pepper Bill is that it expands the
supply of jobs available to older workers. The elimination of age
discrimination and tax credits to employers hiring low income
older workers--as was proposed in the Pepper Bill-would, however,
probably result in only a very modest increase in employment
opportunities.

UNHEALTHY WORKERS:

WORK INCENTIVE IMPACTS

Currently,
some workers--though not eligible for Social
Security or SSI disability-have health problems that constrain
their ability to find and/or continue employment.
While these
health problems are often not so severe as to prevent them from
working, these problems-often in combination with other factors
such as high unemployment--make them less competitive in the labor
market.
It
is
important,
therefore,
to examine the impact of
retirement proposals on this group--unhealthy older workers.
The problem with the benefit reduction approach for this
group is
that to the extent that these workers are incapable of
working due to health reasons, they simply cannot respond to the
incentives that would be established. Of course, not all among
this group are unable to work; however, on average, they are less
attractive
to employers and so their employment opportunities are
limited.
Since health is the major reason given for early retirement,
the Reagan proposals would have exacerbated the problems of a
large portion of future early retirees.
The proposal in the
Reagan package to eliminate all non-medical factors from the
Social Security disability determination process would
have
aggravated the employment problems of unhealthy early retirees.
Age, vocational and educational factors are presently taken into
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account when determining disability eligibility out of recognition
of the special employment problems experienced by older workers
with partial disabilities.
Raising retirement age to 68 would also have a similar impact
on this group. A significant portion of older workers with health
problems will remain unable to work until age 65, let alone 68,
even if the demand for older workers greatly increases. Enactment
of the Pickle Bill, while creating incentives to which some older
workers with health problems could respond, would also have
resulted in expanding the cost of health induced unemployment for
many workers below age 65. In contrast, enactment of the Pepper
Bill, while not likely to have a significant impact on the
employment opportunities of the unhealthy group, would not have
resulted in benefit reductions.
OLDER WOMEN:

WORK INCENTIVE IMPACTS

Older women are more dependent on the Social Security system
for income than older men. The majority (52 percent) of older
women over 65 are widows in contrast to 14 percent of men who are
widowers. Older women are less likely to work than older men and,
if they do, their earnings are likely to be less than men.
For
example, median income from earnings in 1976 was $4065 for
couples, $2300 for unmarried men and $2040 for
unmarried women
(women's Study Program, 1980).
Income from Social Security is
similarly distributed and in terms of private and
special
public-employee pensions, where present, their value tends to be
considerably less for single wamen.
Moreover,
60 percent of
umarried women compared to 46 percent of unmarried men and
considerably fewer couples are entirely dependent on Social
Security for their income.
Because of their increased dependence on Social Security
income,
it seems probable that given good health and
the
availability of employment, women are more likely than men to
increase their work effort in response to
the
incentives
established by both benefit reduction and voluntary approaches.
Consequently, in terms of examining the impact of these proposals,
the issue that needs to be addressed concerns the extent to which
women are in a position to respond to these incentives.
In
are more
less, to
Program,
covered

comparison with older male workers, older female workers
likely to hold service industry occupations which pay
work part-time due to job discouragement (Women's Studies
1980), to have less seniority and job security, to not be
by an employer pension, to experience more unemployment
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and to have experienced less consistent paid work histories due
primarily to child-rearing and other homemaking responsibilities.
The inhermittent labor force involvement of older wanen presents
particular problems to newly single wamen facing the necessity of
employment for the first time in many years or perhaps simply for
the first time. Their lack of recent employment experience often
combines with high levels of unemployment as well as age and sex
discrimination to make labor force re-entry difficult.
In addition to increasing personal incame, older women with
employment opportunities may benefit fram both approaches to
encouraging later retirement in another way. As Shirley Campbell
(1980) points out, to advance professionally, wamen are often
required to sustain great work effort during the same time that
they are under the heaviest child rearing responsibilities.
She
suggests that efforts to raise retirement age could result in
"less pressure to become established while young." Also, it would
seem that the gradual legitimization of a later retirement age
might make mid-life labor force re-entry easier since employers
would anticipate more years of post-training employment. These
points are, of course, highly speculative and debatable.
In spite of these positives, benefit reduction approaches to
later retirement do present many of the same problems for wamen as
for health and unemployed older workers. Data from the Survey of
New Beneficiaries (Reno, 1975) show 67 percent of non-married
wanen and 52 percent of married wamen stating that either health,
compulsory retirement or job discontinuance was the reason they
left their last job within three years of becaning entitled to
social security benefits in 1969.
Among non-married
wanen
entitled at age 62, 41 percent report health reasons and 17
percent job discontinuance. Given the limited employment options
for many women,
it would seem that many wanen would not be in a
position to respond to the incentives that would be created by
either the benefit reduction or voluntary approaches, especially
for the poorest and those with the most limited labor force
histories.

MINORITIES:

WORK INCEWTIVE IMPACTS

Assuming the past and present are good predictors of the
future, disadvantaged
minorities--Blacks,
Hispanics,
Native
Americans and Pacific Asiansare also less likely to be in a
position to continue employment in response to incentives to later
retirement.
Minority workers are more likely than whites to

experience

disabling

health
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conditions

(often

occupationally-related) during late middle age. For example, in
1976, while about 10 percent of social security (OASDI) recipients
were black, about 15 percent of the disabled worker benefits went
to blacks. Similarly, a 1977 survey of Spanish surnamed persons
in five western states shows proportionately greater participation
in
the disability program among Hispanics (Social Security
Administration Advisory Council Reports, 1979).
Data fram the
National Longitudinal Survey of Men show that black men who have
withdrawn from the labor force before age 65 are more subject to
work-limiting health conditions than white men (Sheppard, 1977).
In her study of early labor force withdrawl of men aged 58 to 63,
Karen Schwab (1975) observes:
For black men, as for manual workers, health-imposed
work limitations explain the disproportionate number
out of the labor force.
While
accurate
data are not available on the health
conditions of disadvantaged minorities and sub-groups within these
classifications, as Fernando Torres-Gil points out
"it
is
generally accepted that minorities fall far behind in the level of
health care needed to sustain their work careers up to normal
retirement age" (1980).
The combination of health problems and
the interaction of these conditions with greater occupational
requirement for physical extertion reduces the probability for
continued employment of older minority workers.
Life
expectancies of minorities are generally shorter.
However, the life expectancy gap at age 65 between whites and
groups defined as disadvantaged minorities is slowly closing and
has closed for some groups. For example, 1978 data show that at
age 65 whites can expect to live 16.3 years and "others" 16.1
years (Brottman, 1981).
Still, the proportion of
minority
populations reaching age 65 is considerably smaller than white.
Whereas about 11.5 percent of the white population is 65 and over,
about 7.8 percent of the black population and 3.8 percent of
Hispanics are over 65.
Life expectance at birth are also
considerably shorter-74 for whites and 69.2 for "others."
Minority workers are also more likely to be low-wage workers,
and have careers broken by periods of unemployment.
They are
likely to approach their later working years with considerably
less employment security and pension protection. Assuming a labor
market where jobs are scarce, the probability of their extending
work in response to changing retirement age incentives is greatly
constricted. Because of the shorter life expectancies, fewer

-598-

minorities reach the age at which these proposals would encourage
later retirement. (This situation may change in the future).
More importantly, once reaching these ages, the health status of
disadvantaged minorities seems likely to limit their ability to
continue working.
SUMMARY:

WORK INCENTIVE IMPACTS

As has been discussed in this section, for various reasons
the choice to continue working past age 62 or 65 is constricted
for unhealthy older workers, wamen and minorities.
On the other
hand, healthy older workers with employment opportunities are in a
position to respond positively to later retirement incentives.
The chief differences between the two basic approaches in terms of
encouraging work are 1) the benefit reduction approach (Pickle and
Reagan) do not distinguish between workers who are capable of
working and those that are not, whereas the voluntary approach
does; 2) not only does the voluntary approach seek to encourage
later retirement, but is also directed at expanding employment
opportunities; and 3) the benefit reduction approach does not
require substantial federal expenditures to encourage
later
retirement,
whereas
the
voluntary
approach
does.
Other
differences can be seen when examining the impact of these
approaches in terms of the goal of adequacy and social equity.

ADEQUACY AND SOCIAL EQUITY*
Benefit reduction approaches to encourage later retirement
compromise the goals of adequacy and social equity. As previously
mentioned the Pickle approach represents, on average, a 20 percent
cut in Social Security benefits (over what is promised under the
law when it was proposed) by 2000 when the new retirement age of
68 would be fully phased-in. Similarly, the Reagan proposal would
have resulted in reductions beginning with 1982.
The impact on
persons claiming benefits at or before age 62 would be a one-third
* "Adequacy" refers to a program's effectiveness in meeting the
needs of its covered population.
"Social equity" refers to the
standard that persons in similar circumstances should be treated
in a similar manner. Social equity (or horizontal equity as it is
also termed) is different from individual (or economic) equity the principle that persons who pay more into a system (like Social
Security) should receive large benefits.
It is also different
from "verticle equity" the principle that persons with a greater
need should receive larger benefits.
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reduction in benefits as compared with a 20 percent reduction
under current law.
For persons retiring after age 64, benefit
reductions resulting from changing the benefit formula would,
on
the average,
be 17 percent (Select Camittee on Aging, 1981a).
The potential cost* of benefit reductions resulting from benefit
reduction approaches to encouraging later retirement for unhealthy
older workers,
wonen and minorities is quite high. Incane data
shows that these groups are more likely to have low incomes in
retirement and are, on a whole, not in a good position to sustain
benefit cuts.
In contrast, the voluntary approach to encouraging
later
retirement supplements rather than compromises the adequacy goal,
though in terms of the goal of adequacy the impact of the Pepper
Bill would have been quite modest.
For example, by encouraging
job development through a tax credit, the Pepper Bill would
increase the earnings possibilities for low income older persons.
Also, the gradual increase in the delayed retirement credit would
increase the adequacy of Social Security for some low and middle
income older workers.
Its focus on removing discriminatory
employment practices complements the goal of adequacy.
In terms of the social equity -the similar treatment of
persons in similar circumstances,-the issue revolves around the
reality that different groups of older workers face dissimilar
work/leisure choices.
Benefit reductions to encourage later
retirement seems most fairly applied when used as a means of
leveraging the continued employment of older
workers
with
employment opportunities.
However, where benefit reductions are
applied to workers with
no
or
very
limited
employment
opportunities
there
are
clear inequities.
The employment
opportunities for unhealthy older workers, minorities and women
are more likely to be limited than those of other groups.
Consequently,
not only do the benefit
reduction
proposals
establish inequities between particular individuals, but certain
social groups are also likely to be systematically disadvantaged
by this approach.
To a lesser extent, it
can be argued that the voluntary
approach also establishes inequities between individuals and
between groups.
Rather that using benefit reductions to encourage
later
retirement,
the voluntary approach relies on benefit
increases.
The same argument made with respect to the use of
* "Cost" as used in this sentence refers to "costs to
rather than to taxpayer.
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recipient,"

benefit
reductions applies then to the voluntary approach.
Certain workers and specific groups are less likely to be in a
position to take advantage of these incentives.
This, too,
represents an inequity although plainly it is not as harsh because
no additional loss of benefits results from not responding to the
incentive.
Further,
the aspect of the voluntary approach that
seeks to create additional employment opportunities (especially
for low income workers in the case of the Pepper Bill) is likely
to be especially useful to minority, female and unhealthy older
workers.
Closer
examination of the Pickle and Reagan proposals
identifies the potential impact of the benefit reduction approach
on the adequacy of Social Security for women.
As the following
table shows under the Pickle Bill,
the benefits of spouses,
divorced and widowed women would eventually be reduced. For
example, presently, the full spouse benefit for spouses who retire
at age 65 is 50 percent of the PIA of the retired worker-that is,
50 percent of the normal retirement benefit for workers retiring
at age 65.
Under the Pickle Bill spouses electing to retire at
age 65 would receive 41 percent of what the working spouse
retiring at age 65 receives under current law.
The Reagan proposal also presents some specific problems for
wamen.
The proposal to change the computation points from age 62
to 65 is especially burdensome to women.
Currently, the Social
Security formula calculates the averaged index monthly earnings
(AIME) of a worker by using an averaging period from age 21 to age
62 or from 1951 to age 62 whichever is shorter. After dropping out
the lowest five years of earnings the average monthly indexed wage
is
computed.
In general, persons with larger AIMES are entitled
to larger benefits. The Reagan proposal would have extended the
averaging period by three years--thereby lowering the AIMEs of
future beneficiaries whose benefits would be based on the new

formula.
This
would
disproportionately disadvantage women.
One
problem presently confronting wamen is that Social Security does
not provide credit for years out of the labor force to perform
homemaking functions. Consequently, women often have many years
of zero earnings. Lengthening the averaging would further depress
Social Security benefits for most women with work histories
(Grossman, 1981).
The Reagan early retirement program would have reduced the
value of Social Security benefits for female workers retiring
early, spouses and divorced spouses. Benefits for women retiring
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at age 62 would be reduced from 80 percent to 55 percent of the
PIA. Wives and divorced wives retiring at age 62 as the dependent
of worker would have received 27.5 percent of the PIA as opposed
to 37.5 percent under current law (Miller, 1981).
The proportion
of PIA received by widows would be unchanged, although formula
changes would, of course, result in benefit reductions affecting
widows and all other workers future retirees.

C=FPARISot! OF THE SPOUSE ADD THE WIDOW(ER)S BMI''IS AS A PERCE1IT OF THE PRIEARY
INSURANCE AbOUHTUNDERLAW BEFUREAI AFTER TIE 1983 Ar.
ITS.
61;DFR FULLY
PHASED-IN 1981 PICKLE PROPOSAL ARD REAGA.1PROPOSAL.
Spouse Benefits
at age,

68

Widow(er)s Benefits
at age,

65i_ 62

Non-disabled
Widow(er)s Benefits
at aize,

68

65

6o

1001

71.5,.

71.5% 60.8% 50% A

641'

64

5V-

50%

71.5;;

71. 5

60.8;-

50%

1
71.5;

1
%
71.5% 71.9

law Prior to
1993 Amendments'

50A

50)

37.5%

100O,

Fully Fhased-in
Bill
1981 Pickle

50%

41.

32%

100%

821'

198t Reagan
Proposal

501

50%

27.5%

100%

100%

Fully Phased-in
law as Amended
in 1983

5.
50

41.7%

3

2.5,

100'

91.9-

6o

55%1 50

71.5%

Slithone exception, prior to 2000, the PIA levels are the same under the law as
amended in 1983. The exception concerns disabled widow(er)s benefits which will
be increased to 71.51 of the PIA for ages 50 to 59, beginning in 1984.
J This percent of the PIA is reached at age 67 when the retirement age provision
is fully phased-in.

Another major social equity issue concerns the potential
impacts
of the benefit reduction approach on disadvantaged
minorities. As previously discussed, primarily for reasons of
health limitations, more physically demanding work and more
limited employment opportunities, the choice to continue working
past age 62 or 65 is generally more constricted for older
minorities when compared to other older
persons.
Benefit
reduction

approaches

to encouraging later retirement seem likely

to create new social inequities for older minorities.
For
example, a larger proportion of disadvantaged minorities would be
forced to accept greatly reduced early retirement benefits under
the Reagan Administration proposal. Also, the Pickle proposal
which would have raised retirement age to 68 by 2000 would have
had a similar negative impact on minorities.
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MEETING THE FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Prior
to enactment of the 1983 Amendments, all
but the most
optimistic projections suggest that the combined Old Age Survivors
Disability Insurance program (OASDI) trust
funds had a long
range
deficit.
Using
the most widely accepted
set of intermediate
assumptions
(Alternatives
IIB) about
the performance of
the
economy and demographic changes,
the 1981 report of the Social
Security Trustees Report projected an average
deficit
over
the
next
75
years
of
1.82 percent of taxable
payroll*-which
represented about a
13% shortfall
(Board of Trustees,
1981).
Projections based on more pessimistic assumptions showed larger
deficits.
Ultimately,
the cast programs were
brought
into
actuarial
balance by a combination
of new revenue and benefit
reductions.
Raising the normal age of retirement
under
Social Security
was given active consideration
(and ultimately included in the
1983 Amendments) primarily because of its
ability
to produce
significant long-run
savings. For example, the Social Security's
Office of the Actuary (1981) estimated
the following
costs and
savings as a
percent of taxable payroll from enactment of the
Pickle Bill retirement age provisions:
Raising retirement age
combined with eliminating
the delayed retirement credit.
Elimination of the earnings test.

1.27 percent savings
.05

percent cost

In the long-run, the Pickle retirement age proposals could be
expected to produce a savings of 1.22 percent of taxable payroll.
There would
of course,
be no short-run savings from the bill
because retirement age would not begin to be raised until 1990 and
then only gradually.
Also, there would be a
slight
increase
in
the cost of the
Disabiliy Insurance Program because recipients
would be carried until
age 68, rather than 65.
The other
example of the benefit
reduction approach
to
encouraging later
retirement that has been used in this
paper-the

* Taxable payroll includes all

earnings subject to Social Security

payroll taxation.
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Reagan Administration approach-would have produced even greater
savings. The Office of the Actuary estimated the following
long-run costs and savings as a percent of taxable payroll from
enactmenh of the Reagan retirement age proposals:

Increased actuarial reduction for
early retirement

.71 percent savings

Elimination of dependents benefits
for children of retired workers
aged 62 to 64

.02 percent savings

Removal of non-medical factors from
the social security disability
determination process

.06 percent savings

Changing the computation points
from 62 to 65

.25 percent savings

Increase the bend points in the
social security benefit formula
by 50 percent instead of 100
percent of wage increases between
1982 and 1987
Eliminate the earnings test

1.29 percent savings

.14 percent cost

The net long-run savings from the Reagan retirement age
proposals would have been 2.19 percent of taxable payroll.
Because some of these proposals would go into effect by 1982,
the
Reagan approach would have produced significant short-run as well
as long-run savings.
(Ultimately, the retirement age proposal
included in the 1983 Amendments saved about 0.7 percent of taxable
payroll).
By
changing
retirement expectations and behavior,
the
voluntary approach to encouraging later retirement can also be
expected to produce long-run savings to the Social Security
system.
The exact amount of savings is
difficult to predict
because it is dependent on the degree to which positive incentives
will change the retirement decision.
If, for example, the Age
Discrimination Employment Study projections are correct and the
elimination of mandatory retirement would add almost 200,000 older
workers to the workforce by 2000, then it is clear that the Pepper
proposal to eliminate mandatory retirement would produce some
small savings to Social Security since fewer would be collecting
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their benefits and more would be paying taxes. Similarly, the
Pepper proposals to encourage later retirement by providing a tax
credit for the employment of low income older workers and
requiring continued accrual of benefits for older workers after
the normal age of retirement would also result in a very modest
savings for Social Security by increasing the older labor force.
(In 1983, a similar proposal to eliminate mandatory retirement was
estimated as saving .03 percent of taxable payroll.) In terms of
the Office of the
the long-run costs as a percent of payroll,
Actuary projected the following changes from the two Pepper
retirement age proposals that would alter the Social Security
law:
Graduated increase in the delayed
retirement credit

.02 percent cost

Liberalized earnings test

.01 percent cost

There is,
however, an additional indirect cost which is not
Liberalizing the earnings test
measured in these cost estimates.
and delayed retirement credit has the distinct disadvantage of
reducing the savings to Social Security in the future that results
from any future increase in labor force participation among
In the long-run the Pepper Bill would have a
persons 60 and over.
direct cost to Social Security of about .03 percent of taxable
payroll.
This would have been offset by savings from eliminating
The tax credit proposal would have
mandatory
retirement.
increased general revenue expenditures by an estimated 31 million
As
(Select Cmmittee on Aging, 1981c).
dollars in fiscal 1982
discussed, long-run savings to Social Security can be anticipated
as a result of workers altering their retirement expectations and
behavior; the magnitude of these savings is, however, difficult to
predict.
Even under the most optimistic projections of the ability of
voluntary incentives to alter the retirement decision, there are
two reasons why it is unrealistic to expect voluntary approaches
to produce nearly as much savings for Social Security as benefit
more
First, voluntary incentives are
reduction approaches.
Instead of eliminating benefits to encourage later
expensive.
retirement, the emphasis is on selective improvement of benefits
Second,
and more importantly, the
to create work incentives.
benefit reduction approach produces clear savings by reducing the
financial camitment of the program to future retirees.
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CONCLUSION
This paper has assessed the degree to which benefit reduction
and voluntary approaches to encouraging later retirement meet four
different and often conflicting retirement policy objectives: 1)
providing work incentives for older workers, 2) income adequacy,
3) social equity and 4) financing social security. It also
identifies the costs and benefits of these aproaches to healthy
older workers,
unhealthy ones, wamen and minorities.
Both of
these approaches are potentially effective means of encouraging
later retirement; however, each is associated with a different set
of priorities in terms of meeting the goals of adequacy, social
equity and containment of the Social Security financing.
Benefit reduction approaches to encouraging later retirement
campramise adequacy and social equity goals for the purpose of
producing savings in Social Security. The reverse seems largely
true of voluntary approaches.
In short, while benefit reduction
approaches to encouraging later retirement would produce greater
savings in the Social Security program, they would do so in part,
at the expense of older persons who experience limited opportunity
for employment.
On the other hand, voluntary approaches would not
impact these persons negatively, nor are they likely to produce
large savings.
The cost savings goal assuned primacy in the retirement age
debate which culminated with the enactment of the 1983 Amendments
to the Social Security Act.
The poor performance of the economy
since 1977 makes it possible to consider social welfare policies
in the 1980s that were politically unacceptable only ten years
ago. Support for raising the normal age of retirement was
justified by projected deficits in Social Security as well as the
belief that the general decline in labor force participation of
older workers during the past 35 years is
a result of the
increased availability of early and normal retirement benefits.
Given this, certain prescriptions follow.
To encourage later
retirement age and reduce Social Security costs, simply raise
retirement and/or reduce benefits for early retirees.
As this paper has suggested, evidence exists to challenge the
belief that the great majority of older workers leave work
voluntarily and in good health. Also, analysis of the development
of early and normal retirement options within specific industries
and
in the Country as a whole suggests that historically
retirement policy has been used as a
means
of
reducing
unemployment by enticing older workers out of the labor force in
exchange for a pension. To the extent that older workers do not
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have control over their retirement (or continued employment)
decision, then reliance on benefit reduction means to encourage
later retirement will result in faulty policy, because significant
portions of the savings produced would come from sane of the most
vulnerable older persons.
In the absence of a general improvement in the employment
opportunities for older workers and in the availability of
disability benefits for older workers with health problems,
the only equitable means of
provide
approaches
voluntary
seem
Such approaches do, however,
encouraging later retirement.
likely to fall quite short in terms of meeting the objective of
Hence, the policy dilema.
financing Social Security.
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